Rafael Grillo Avila, Michael Wolosin, Alec Roth, Ruben Lubowski, Pedro Piris-Cabezas, Garrett Russo

Carbon & Climate Law Review, Volume 10 (2016), Issue 2, Page 134 - 143

As the 191 Member States of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) move to finalize a global market-based measure (MBM) to cap the carbon dioxide emissions of international civil aviation at 2020 levels, interested stakeholders have begun to consider the potential supply of carbon credits that might be available to offset airlines’ emissions above capped levels. This article analyses the potential supply of emissions units from programmes to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+) in tropical forest countries, and compares that to the potential demand for such units from international aviation under a global MBM. The article briefly reviews the legal context of the ICAO MBM; summarizes the legal framework for REDD+ established under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) as well as programmes to help tropical countries get ready for REDD+; and notes the underpinnings of provisions relating to the avoidance of double-counting of emissions units. The article then presents estimates of the demand for aviation offsets and the availability of REDD+ units, in the near, medium, and long term, while also considering the need to ensure any of these units used to offset aviation emissions are not double-claimed toward a host country’s emissions reductions plans under the Paris Agreement. The article concludes that REDD+ could provide a significant source of emissions unit supply for international aviation; that an important challenge to realizing this supply is the need for a strong signal of market demand; and that the ICAO MBM has the potential to provide this necessary demand signal.

Annie Petsonk, Pedro Piris-Cabezas

Carbon & Climate Law Review, Volume 10 (2016), Issue 2, Page 127 - 133

In considering how the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) might construct a global market based measure to assist airlines in meeting international civil aviation’s goal of capping carbon dioxide emissions at 2020 levels, the authors review different perspectives on one element of the design of the market based measure. Specifically, insofar as achieving “carbon neutral growth from 2020” entails not only reducing international aviation’s emissions as much as possible, but also procuring, via carbon markets, emission reductions to offset emissions above 2020 levels, then a key question becomes how offset responsibilities will be distributed between and among participating airlines. Bridging differences between States on the issue of allocation of offset responsibilities is crucial to the adoption of an ICAO market based measure. After reviewing briefly the historical context for the allocation debate, namely CBDR and its counterpart concept in ICAO, the concept of special circumstances and respective capabilities, the authors propose that States address distribution of offset obligations in ICAO by starting with the 100% sectoral approach, with an important modification: any carrier that reduces its individual emissions below a three-year average baseline may “keep” or save its reductions as a credit against its offset obligations. Such an approach could encourage carriers to invest in in-sector reductions, help them reap the benefit of those investments, generate cost-savings, and bridge differences over the distribution of offset obligations in a way that provides equal and fair opportunities to all carriers.