Ralph Bodle, Stephan Sina

Carbon & Climate Law Review, Volume 16 (2022), Issue 1, Page 18 - 24

The German Federal Constitutional Court's decision of March 2021 declared the Climate Change Act partially unconstitutional because it did not sufficiently protect fundamental rights. While the Court upheld the Act's objective of climate neutrality by 2050 and emission budgets until 2030, it held that the Climate Change Act violated fundamental rights for the time after 2030: The specific emissions budgets until 2030 entailed that strict measures would likely be required after 2030 in order to achieve climate neutrality. The Climate Change Act failed to sufficiently address in advance how this would affect individual freedoms. We provide an overview of the main findings of the decision as well as the ensuing amendments to the Climate Change Act, which were passed within just a few months after the decision and are subject to new constitutional challenges.

Ralph Bodle, Vicky Noens

Carbon & Climate Law Review, Volume 12 (2018), Issue 3, Page 248 - 257

At the climate conference in Katowice, Poland, in December 2018 (COP 24), Parties to the Paris Agreement intend to adopt a comprehensive set of decisions that provide details on its implementation, based on the so-called Paris Agreement Work Programme (PAWP). We outline some of the many finance issues to be addressed COP 24 and look more in-depth at two particular issues: the overarching goal regarding finance flows in Article 2(1)(c); and transparency of support. Article 2(1)(c) is a major innovation because it establishes addressing financial flows as one of the three goals of the Paris Agreement. At the same time it is an essential means to achieve the mitigation and adaptation goals. Article 2(1)(c) has a transformational objective with huge potential implications in the real world. Despite its overarching importance, the current negotiations do not address Article 2(1)(c) in the holistic manner it requires. Transparency of support relates to the delivery of information and data on financial and other support within the UNFCCC. The Paris Agreement requires Parties to ‘build on and enhance’ the existing transparency arrangements. The current negotiations are focused mainly on the financial support provided by developed countries, with less time dedicated towards support received and other parts of the bigger picture. If it was more balanced and addressed all aspects of transparency of support, the real-world impact of the transparency framework could be considerable.

Ralph Bodle, Lena Donat, Matthias Duwe

Carbon & Climate Law Review, Volume 10 (2016), Issue 1, Page 5 - 22

The Paris Agreement is a landmark in international climate policy. Both developed and developing countries agree to take action, embedded in their national context and towards agreed transformational long-term objectives. It is also a watershed in differentiating between developing and developed countries. It breaks new ground by supplementing the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, by its core obligations for all parties and by its range of techniques used to express differentiation. The core legal obligations are mainly procedural, as the Paris Agreement does not prescribe specific mitigation actions or emission levels. Instead, in five-year “cycles”, all parties have to prepare and enhance individual climate plans (NDCs) and be accountable for their implementation. Despite limitations in the legal detail, the Paris Agreement’s political narrative goes way beyond its legal text. The approach is an experiment that relies on the national determination of efforts combined with the persuasive impact of the transparency framework and the regular taking stock of progress. The future details to these elements could be crucial for safeguarding ambition.

Lena Donat, Ralph Bodle

Carbon & Climate Law Review, Volume 8 (2014), Issue 1, Page 23 - 34

To provide an effective response to climate change over time, the 2015 Agreement needs to incorporate dynamic elements, including a possibility for adjusting Parties‘ commitments over time. A dynamic adjustment mechanism could help to adjust commitments to the necessary ambition level and to changing circumstances. The challenge is to design such amechanism in a way that would make it objective and stringent while being agreeable for Parties. This article provides a structured approach for developing and evaluating options for a dynamic adjustment mechanism in the 2015 Agreement, drawing from previous experience in the climate regime, other multilateral environmental agreements, and from literature. We explore possible design elements of a mechanism, namely triggers, process, consequences, and derogations, assessing their assets and drawbacks.We argue that an automatic ratchet-upmechanismdoes not appear to be a viable option, and that an adjustmentmechanism based on a procedural approach negotiations currently seems more realistic. However, in order to ensure a certain degree of objectivity in the process, it is essential that commitments in the 2015 agreement are quantifiable and comparable in their mitigation impact across countries and commitment types.