Fitsum Tiche, Stefan Weishaar, Oscar Couwenberg

Carbon & Climate Law Review, Volume 8 (2014), Issue 2, Page 97 - 105

A sub-global emissions trading scheme (ETS) risks harming competitiveness and causing carbon leakage. These concerns cast doubt on the efficiency and environmental effectiveness of unilateral climate policies. ETSs implemented thus far include measures to address competitiveness and leakage concerns. This paper analyses the extent to which these unilateralmeasures affect linking of ETSs by taking the EuropeanUnion Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) and the Australian Carbon Pricing Mechanism (ACPM) as case studies. In both the EU ETS and the ACPM, the free allocation of allowances to emissions-intensive trade-exposed sectors is the primary instrument of addressing leakage and competitiveness concerns. They, however, use different systems of free allocation. Although linking ETSs with different systems of allocation is technically possible, certain differences give rise to efficiency, competitiveness, equity, and environmental effectiveness concerns.

Stefan Weishaar, Edwin Woerdman

Carbon & Climate Law Review, Volume 6 (2012), Issue 2, Page 114 - 127

This paper presents empirical evidence of a small but statistically highly significant windfall profit in the German spot auctions of allowances under the EU Emissions Trading System in the second trading phase. Auction prices lie with 7 and 8 Eurocents below the Leipzig Energy Exchange and the Paris Blue Next market price, respectively. Compared to the Initial Public Offerings literature the under-pricing effect is small. However, it does call into question the wide-spread belief that allowance auctioning eradicates all windfall profits. Moreover, it is examined if these windfall profits give rise to State aid concerns. We argue that auctions in the second and third trading phase pass the private investor test and thus do not constitute State aid, although selectivity could become problematic in the third trading phase. We conclude that the political problem of windfall profits for the energy sector may persist in the third trading phase.

Marjan Peeters, Stefan Weishaar

Carbon & Climate Law Review, Volume 3 (2009), Issue 1, Page 14

ng the EU greenhouse gas emissions trading scheme (EU ETS) was delivered hardly five years after adoption of the EU ETS Directive.1 The amendment of the EU ETS agreed upon politically in December 2008 strives 88 Exploring Uncertainties in the EU ETS CCLR 1|2009 * Marjan Peeters is Professor of Environmental Policy and Law, in particular climate change issues, at Maastricht University. Stefan Weishaar is Assistant Professor at Maastricht University. This paper was written in the contract-research framework “Emissions Trading and Equal Competitio